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Over the last decades, the Portuguese economy exhibited an outstanding growth 
performance. This period of fast economic growth allowed the country to consistently 
reduce its income gap with respect to the EU average.  In spite of this, regions in 
Portugal exhibited large differences between each other in terms of GDP per capita.  
Yet, the Portuguese government did make attempts at regional intervention by means of 
some policy instruments, namely public transfers to local (and regional) government. 
How successful these policies have been in terms of achieving their goal is still an open 
question, especially as far as Portuguese Central Government transfers are concerned. 
The main purpose of the paper is to evaluate if the system of Central Government 
transfers has affected the intra-regional Portuguese convergence.  
We haven’t found unquestionable evidence that these policies have been effective at 
stimulating convergence among Portuguese regions and at improving the overall 
economies of the poorer regions. 
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  {PAGE  }Introduction 
 
One of the aspects of integration theory is related with the fact that what it promises is 
possible economic gains for the countries involved. However, there is no guarantee that 
these can ever be achieved. Regional integration can result in losses rather than gains, 
and the losses (measured in terms of output, employment, income, social inequality) can 
be unevenly spread across different countries and different regions inside the countries.     
Many observers have pointed out that during the 1980’s and the 1990’s regional 
disparities in the European Union (EU) showed no tendency to decrease and, on 
contrary, they increase, while the cross-country dispersion of per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) decreased (Neven and Gouyette, 1995; Fabergen and Vespergen, 1996; 
Magrini, 1999). All this facts still justify the aim of the EU regional policy.   
In recent years, there has been an ongoing debate on regional policy in Europe and the 
present member states of the EU. The main reason for this debate is the EU’s eastern 
enlargement, which may lead to an increase in regional divergence within the EU. Most 
of the regions in the accession countries have, up to now, a GDP per capita which is 
significant below the European average, what will make them eligible for European 
regional policy measures after the enlargement has taken place. The GDP per capita in 
the regions of the accession countries is also lower than the GDP per capita in the 
majority of regions within the existing EU that are supported today by European 
regional policy measures. After the enlargement, according to the existing rules of 
European regional policy, these regions will drop out of the system of EU regional 
policy - although their economic development problems will not have changed. There 
are different proposals in order to help the regions in question after the enlargement. 
Some scholars and politicians are suggesting that the EU should expand its budget for 
regional policy and give not only support to the regions in the accession countries, but 
also to the regions which are supported today by the EU. Others are proposing that 
regional policy should be re-nationalized, at least for the existing member states.  
In this context, the debate turns to the efficiency of national regional policies in order to 
promote convergence and cohesion intra-nations. Only if the regional policies in each 
country have positive effects in regions the second proposal is coherent with the 
maintenance of regional concerns of EU. 
  {PAGE  }Regional policy is always a policy of a more central level of government in order to 
help some regions or jurisdictions at a lower level of government to improve their 
economic performance. This makes it necessary that a jurisdiction at a higher level of 
government is transferring some kind of resources to the supported regions. 
Acording to Carlino and Mills (1996) regional distribution of transfers tends to 
reinforce trends in regional per capita income convergence. 
Portuguese National Budget typically induces a substantial redistribution of resources 
across regions through transfers to municipalities. This is an example of regional policy 
at national level in Portugal. The principal concern of this policy is to influence the 
dispersion of regional incomes and to promote or accelerate regional income 
convergence and cohesion.  
Several studies have analysed the evolution of the regional economies of Portugal, 
without relating them explicitly to regional policies. This paper seeks to examine the 
regional incidence of transfers’ policy in Portugal and to consider the mechanism in 
place for both redistributing income between regions and narrowing disparities in 
regional economic performance. We study transfers data for all Portuguese 
municipalities, grouped by NUTS II for the period 1980-2001, that covers the allocation 
of municipal transfers since their creation by the Law 1/79 in 2
nd January until 2001.  
To describe the economies of the regions and their evolutions, we present several 
statistics for five years spanning a 21- year period: the start and ending points of our 
sample (1980 and 2001). The three intermediate years correspond to important dates in 
European integration process: the year of accession of Portugal to European Economic 
Community (1986), the year of European Union Treaty (1992) and 1999, the first year 
of third phase of the European and Monetary Union. All euro-denominated data are in 
1995 euros. In the text, the words per capita GDP, income and Gross Value Added 
(GVA) are used as synonyms to evaluate the regional development levels.  
Our goal is to draw some inferences from the data about how the system of transfers has 
affected the intra-regional Portuguese convergence. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows. In section I we summarize some theoretical and empirical aspects in regional 
policy applied to Central Governments transfers. Section II describes municipal 
transfer’s arrangements and their legal evolution in Portugal. Section III is a description 
of the economic performance of the Portuguese regions between 1980 and 2001. In 
  {PAGE  }section IV we analyse how this kind of regional policy have affected the economies of 
the regions. In the final section we conclude. 
 
 
I. Basic Theoretical and Empirical Aspects on Regional Policy: Intergovernmental 
Transfers for Municipalities 
  
In economic theory, there is often some confusion on the meaning of “regional policy”. 
Some scholars and politicians are identifying regional policy with all kinds of policy 
measures of a region that are oriented to economic growth. Nonetheless, in this view, 
there would be no difference between regional policy and economic growth policy in 
general. Therefore, in this paper, we take regional policy as economic policy for regions 
conduced by policymakers from higher level of government: “Regional policy is always 
a policy from above” (Artobolevsky, 1997), what means that a minimum degree of 
centralization is always required for regional policy.  
Other three important characteristics may define regional policy. First, the targets of 
regional policy are either growth - or equalization - oriented, which means that some 
concepts of regional policy are aiming at supporting the economic growth centers of an 
economy, in order to strengthen national economic growth. Second, regional policy 
exists only when regions receive unequal levels of support or rights from the state 
(Artobolevsky, 1997), which means that regional policy always includes an element of 
interregional redistribution. Third, regional policy tries to promote or stimulate private 
economic activities in certain regions (“supported regions”) and is not aiming at only 
compensating those regions that are economically lagging behind
1.   
Governments can certainly influence the rate at which regions accumulate various 
productive factors - particularly infrastructures and human capital - and there were 
positive redistributive effects as well as growth effects in regional intervention from 
Central Government. Consequently, national, institutional and political configurations 
determine the distinctive outcome of regional policy. 
                                                 
1 The system of general revenue sharing (the fiscal equalization principle) has the task of only 
compensanting the poorer regions. 
  {PAGE  }A case against regional policies can be found in some papers in the regional 
convergence literature (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; and especially Sala-i-Martin, 
1996). While these authors find that the speed of regional convergence is very low in 
Europe and in other samples, they are also sceptical about government’ ability to speed 
up the regional convergence process. The main piece of evidence for this conclusion is a 
significant empirical regularity: the visible stability of the rate of convergence (close to 
2 per cent a year in a diversity of samples). According to Sala-i-Martin, the fact that 
convergence takes place at nearly the same speed within groups of regions 
hypothetically characterized by quit different levels of redistributive effort implies that 
such policies cannot be very effective. Even if the stability of the convergence 
coefficient across different samples may indicate the level of redistributive effort has 
been too small to have a perceptible effect on the evolution of regional income 
disparities, it cannot be taken as evidence that regional policy per se is necessarily 
ineffective. Perhaps, the regional policies had not been very effective in some cases.   
In sum, regional policy is always a policy (more or less effective) of a more central 
level of government in order to help some regions or jurisdictions at a lower level of 
government to improve their economic performance. This makes it necessary that a 
jurisdiction at a higher level of government is transferring some kind of resources to the 
supported regions. 
The Central Government transfers to different regions or local areas can take two forms: 
interpersonal transfers (the focus is on the net amount of money actually paid/received 
by taxpayers’ resident in different jurisdictions) and intergovernmental transfers (the 
focus is on the amount of resources transferred to/among local governments in order to 
achieve a more equalized distribution). The transfers discussed in this paper refer 
exclusively to those paid directly to municipalities and that pretend to result in a 
levelling of regional income differences. 
Transfers from Central Government are an important tool, not only for the public sector 
finance, but also for the regional policy, in both industrialized and developing countries.  
Governments introduce intergovernmental transfers for a number of good reasons, and 
for a number of not-so-good reasons. In this part of the section we review the reasons 
for transfers, and we stress the point that the design of the system should be driven by 
the objectives to be accomplishes.  
  {PAGE  }A large part of the literature on intergovernamental transfers deals with their economic 
rationale. In this, it is presume that economic objectives are the sole consideration for 
determining the quantum of transfers and the design of transfers systems. Of course, 
even economic objectives have political undertones and in actual practice, the volume 
and the distribution of transfers largely reflect political compromises, and they are 
designed to sub serve a host of political objectives.  
Three economic reasons can be pointed to justify the role of transfers. First, Central 
Governments have advantages over subnational governments in raising revenues from 
many types of particularly productive sources, while subnational governments have 
advantages in providing many types of public services. There is virtually always an 
imbalance between expenditure responsibilities of subnational governments and their 
revenue raising powers. With economic growth and urbanization, public expenditures 
needs shift more toward services provided by local governments. The result is an 
inability of local governments to provide adequate levels of public service. The gap 
must be filled in one of two ways: by giving local governments more revenue raising 
power or by revenue transfers from the Central Government to the subnational 
governments.  
Equalization is another justification for intergovernmental transfers: there are often 
substantial disparities in revenue-raising capacity across decentralized levels of 
government. If subnational governments were left to rely exclusively on their own 
resources, wealthier jurisdictions would be able to spend more on public services than 
lower-income jurisdictions. Such a situation has not only equity implications but 
efficiency implications as well. Developed countries are characterized by wide fiscal 
disparities among regions. These disparities will widen because the richest local 
governments have the greatest taxable capacities and the strongest administrative 
infrastructures. 
If countries aim to equalize inter-regional differences in financial capacities, it must be 
done with intergovernmental transfers. The potential to equalize does not necessarily 
mean that equalization will occur, nor does it mean that equalization is necessarily a 
good policy for a country. The effects also depend on the distribution formulae used to 
allocate resources among the local governments. 
  {PAGE  }Third, when local governments are left to make their own decisions, they may 
underspend on certain services where there are substantial external benefits to third 
parties, such as surrounding local governments. In addition to this, resources from the 
central level can be used to ensure that basic national priorities will be met in all 
subnational jurisdictions. In cases of existing externalities on other jurisdictions, the 
Central Government financially support sub-national authorities in order to guarantee 
the provision of some public services on the local level like pollution control and basic 
education (Tiebout, 1961; Davis and Lucker, 1982; Hyman, 1993; Rosen, 1995; 
Dahlby, 1996; Ahmad and Craig, 1997).   
According Nam and Parsche (2001), intergovernmental transfers are aimed at rectifying 
not only the vertical imbalance caused by the unequal own tax revenues and 
expenditures of different tiers of governments but also the horizontal imbalance which 
is led by the different fiscal capacities among same level jurisdictions
2.The 
compensation for the presence of spillovers or “externalities” between jurisdictions in 
the provision of regional and local public services is also a generally accepted reason for 
introducing fiscal transfers from Central Government. 
The amount of grants should vary with the local expenditure needs and inversely with 
local fiscal capacity, while their distribution must be transparent and fair. More 
importantly, an effective transfers system should neither encourage overspending nor 
weaken tax collection efforts on the sub-national level (Gage and Mandell, 1990; Jones 
and Cullis, 1994; Bahl and Linn, 1994; Shah, 1994a and 1994b; Winkler, 1994; Oates, 
1998). 
A major issue faced by those who design transfer system and are driven by the vertical 
balance objective is how to measure vertical fiscal balance. In order to know how much 
transfer is necessary, one estimate the difference between the revenues available to 
subnational governments as a whole, and the expenditure needs of each level of 
government. This is quite a subjective matter, because expenditure needs are almost 
limitless. Most countries that use the vertical balance approach determine a “minimum 
service level”, and fill the gap with transfers. In some cases, the amount of transfers is 
determined by a central budget constraint rather than by a “minimum requirements” 
                                                 
2 The re-allocation of fiscal resources from one level of government to another can also take place 
through sharing of tax revenues. In this case tax bases can be shared on a tax-by-tax basis, or taxes can be 
pooled and shared systematically therefore. 




II. Transfers from the Central Government of Portugal 
 
The national government retain control of most major tax bases but is constitutionally 
committed to transfer an increasing share of revenues to municipalities. The Portuguese 
Constitution establishes in its article 254, n.
er 1 (share in the revenue from direct 
taxation) that: “Municipalities shall share, in their own right, and in accordance with 
the law, the revenue from direct taxation”. This is a municipal revenue sharing system, 
which assigned to the municipalities a share of the total current fiscal revenues of the 
national government. The meaning of this name may be misleading, since it is not a 
sharing on revenues on a derivation basis, but an unconditional funding distributed 
among municipalities by a formula that takes into account specific variables. 
The main source of spending balance of the Portuguese regional authorities 
(municipalities) has been the transfers from the Central Government. The importance 
that such transfers assume for Portuguese municipalities in general is evident. As we 
can conclude from figure II.1, the share of Central Government transfers on total 
municipalities receipts starts from being above 60 per cent and has declined along the 
two decades, reaching less than 30 per cent in 2001. This evolution can be explained by 
the growing capability of each municipality to raise own receipts through the rising of 
municipality debt and the collection of municipality taxes, especially in the last decade.  
The system of transfers to local governments follow the Constitutional Principle of 
Financial Balance (article 238, n.
er 2), that is, a financial balance means the fair 
distribution of financial public resources between the State and municipalities (vertical 
fiscal balance) and between municipalities of the same type or degree
3 (horizontal fiscal 
balance).  
Discussions over the criteria for the definition of the global transfer from the State 
budget to the municipalities, as well as over the criteria for the relative weight of each 
region, have a long history. In Portugal conscious efforts are made to increase the 
                                                 
3 Horizontal Fiscal Balance implies that transfers be set to equate revenues in per capita terms. It ignores 
local differences in needs, in costs and in own revenue-raising capacity (Chaparro et al, 2004).  
  {PAGE  }revenue available in areas where the local tax base is considered insufficient to meet 
spending needs, or to where the costs of services which need to be provided are higher 
than normal. One of the purposes of part of the transfers is, not only, to endow the 
municipalities with minimum financial capacity for functioning, but also, to correct 
differences between municipalities and, as a consequence, promote intra-country 
cohesion and convergence.    
The Local Finance Law (LFL) 1/79 in 2
nd January laid out the specific parameters of 
financial transfers from Central Government to municipalities and local administration. 
The overall amount of resources to be distributed among municipalities is determined 
every year by law, and is updated in accordance with certain criteria that are applied 
automatically.  Initially all the transfers from Central Government were called Financial 
Balance Fund (FEF) and aims to correct, not only socio-economic asymmetries inside 
the country, but also the financial imbalances created by different fiscal capacity of each 
region. Following the Law (Revision Law 1/87 in 6
th Jannuary), the FEF for each year is 
calculated according to { EMBED Equation.3  }, with n as the current year, n-1 the year 
before and VAT as Value Added Tax established in the Central Government Budget. 
The total amount of FEF is allocated to municipalities according to some social and 
economic criteria, like number of inhabitants, municipal road network or direct taxes 
per capita. The allocation of five per cent of the FEF depends directly from the legally 
defined Socio-economic Development Index (SDI). This Index is calculated for each 
municipality according to industrialization level, weight of primary activities in 
economy, the total dependency coefficient, accessibility, needs of basic infrastructures 
and domestic energy consumption per inhabitant. All these elements were used to 
evaluate the municipality development level.  
In 1992 (Law 2/92 in 9
th March), the Fiscal Compensation Index (FCI) of each 
municipality, that represents 5 per cent of the criteria for the transfers distribution, 
replaced the SDI. This new index depends on the gap between fiscal capitation of each 
municipality and the average fiscal capitation in what concerns to some municipality 
taxes.       
In Portugal, the new Law (42/98 in 6
th August) extinguished the FEF and created three 
new instruments. The first one, the Municipalities’ General Fund (FGM) allocates 
  {PAGE  }resources to the regions, largely based on regional needs for spending per capita
4. A 
second fund, with explicit cohesion objectives Municipal Cohesion Fund (FCM) is 
limited to less developed municipalities, while an additional fund aim to ensure that the 
municipalities have adequate resources Parish Financing Fund (FFF). 
The municipalities’ participation in the state taxes is currently defined by the Law n.
er 
4/2001, of 20
th August. At present, the financial state transfers to municipalities are 
processed through the three distinct instruments referred above. 
 
i) Municipalities’ General Fund 
The fund aims to endow the municipalities with financial conditions adjusted to their 
performance in terms of effected investment relative to attributions. The objective is to 
put in place a vertical balance, that is, an equitable distribution of the public resources 
between the State and the local authorities, in function of the type and amount of 
carried-out investments per item.  
The name of this fund results from the fact that is attributed to all municipalities, in 
contrast to the municipal cohesion fund.  
The total of the FGM is distributed through three territorial units (Continent, 
Autonomous Region of Açores and Autonomous Region of Madeira), as a direct 
function of criteria like resident population or area. 
The distribution to the municipalities inside territorial units obeys to a variety of 
different criteria, such as: resident population under 15 years, the number of 
municipalities within the region, area, or total receipts of direct taxes. 
 
ii) Municipal Cohesion Fund 
This fund aims at strengthening municipal cohesion and fostering the correction of 
asymmetries, to the benefit of the less developed municipalities. Its objective is to 
promote horizontal balance, that is, to correct the differences between municipalities of 
the same degree or type, through a harmonious distribution of the State transfers. 
This fund had not been foreseen in the previous law but was created as a complement to 
the FGM, to be received only by those municipalities with a development level below 
                                                 
4 The value is assessed centrally, involving the estimation of a standardised level of public service per 
head of population. 
  {PAGE  }the national average. The FCM is distributed according to the Fiscal Need Index and the 
Socio-economic Development Index. These two criteria give an idea about the 
municipality inferiority comparatively to the national average.    
The assignments of this fund have been inherited from the Cohesion Fund created by 
the European Union in favour of its less developed Member States, namely in Southern 
Europe.  
 
iii) Parish Financing Fund 
When the law of local finance began to be enforced, the parish (smallest administrative 
units in Portugal) at the outset had the right to an autonomous fund corresponding to 2.5 
per cent of the simple arithmetic average of the receipts from direct (personal and 
corporate) and indirect (VAT) taxation, assigned for FFF.  
This fund is distributed through three territorial units (Continent, Açores and Madeira) 
in accordance with criteria such as resident population and area. Twenty five per cent of 
the total amount of these transfers is equally spread by the national parish.    
On the Budget Law of 2001 the item c) of paragraph 12 was designed temporarily as 
one more transfer that must be considered. In the following years, it was substituted by 
Municipal Base Fund (FBM). The regional distribution of item follows the same criteria 
of this last fund considered in 2002: it aims to endow the municipalities with minimum 
financial capacity for their functioning and is distributed on equal terms and by equal 
amounts for all the municipalities.  
As we can conclude, the transfers are allocated among municipalities according to a 
complex collection of indicators (see table II.1) that suppose to assess regional needs 
and local taxable capacity. Two notable features of Portuguese system can be point out: 
population criteria receive a large weigh and part of the transfers amount is equally 
distributed by all the municipalities.      
The evolution of total Central Government transfers to municipalities (figure II.2) 
follows the same increasing trend as Portuguese GDP, but the transfers have been grow 
at a higher rate.  
In percentage of regional GDP (table II.2), public transfers ranged between 0.47 per 
cent (for the richer area of Centro) and 5.92 per cent (the poor region of Alentejo) of 
regional GDP in 1980, and between 1.08 per cent (for the richer area of Lisboa e Vale 
  {PAGE  }do Tejo) and 6.84 per cent (the poor region of Alentejo) in 2001. Taking all funds 
together, public transfers to municipalities in terms of regional GDP increased steadily 
over the period 1980-2001, with a higher increase in some of the poorer regions 
(Alentejo and Açores). An exception in this trend is between 1987 and 1988, when 
almost all the regions had an enormous decrease, with especial significance for 
Alentejo.   
As shown in table II.3, the transfers per capita are highest in the least prosperous 
regions, namely Alentejo, Algarve and Açores. Between 1980 and 1990, Alentejo and 
Algarve were top receivers. Alentejo, in particular, received almost twice of the 
Portuguese average. Since 1990, Alentejo remained as the first receiver of Central 
Government transfers per capita, but the second place in the rank order belongs to 
Açores. The regions that are consistently below average recipients of transfers included 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, Madeira and Norte.  
In sum, in most of the years, the receiver regions were Alentejo, Algarve and Açores, 
the same is to say that these two regions were top receivers for each of the four public 
transfers. The non-receiver regions consisted of Lisboa e Vale do Tejo and Norte. In 
fact, the correlation between transfers - per capita and as percentage of GDP - and 
regional GDP per capita  (table II.2 and II.3) is negative in all years between 1980 and 
2001. This means that the transfers per capita preserve the same rule: they were 
relatively higher in less prosperous and poorer regions. Looking at figure II.3, it is also 
evident that there are a negative relation between transfers and regional GDP per capita, 
both in 2001 and in 1990.   
As can be seen by examining the coefficients of variation displayed in the last but one 
rows of table II.2 and II.3, there was no significant disparity across the seven regions in 
the amounts received under transfers to municipalities. The fact that they not vary 
across regions could imply that there are not differential impacts on economic 
performance. This result can be confirmed with the Chi-Square test (last row) for 
similarity in transfers per capita and transfers as percentage of GDP. In what concerns 
to transfers per capita we can conclude that in all years the null hypotheses is rejected 
and inequality in distribution seems to be a fact, but relatively to the transfers as 
percentage of GDP the conclusion is ambiguous. Between 1980 and 1992 there were 
disparities between region, but after that year it seems that transfers are more equally 
  {PAGE  }distributed. This can be explained by the convergence between regions that implies that 
transfers tend to be less imbalanced in the end of the period.    
 
 
III. Economic Performance of the Portuguese Regions 
 
Over the last decades, the Portuguese economy exhibited an outstanding growth 
performance. Between 1980 and 2001, Portugal was ranked fourth among 25 OECD 
countries in terms of growth of per capita GDP, and third in terms of growth of GDP 
per worker. This period of fast economic growth allowed the country to consistently 
reduce its income gap in relation to the EU average. 
The question is whether the Portuguese regions equally shared growth. Using data from 
Eurostat and INE (Portuguese Statistics Institute), Mateus’s (2001) study suggests that 
convergence has been achieved, in the sense that the poorest regions have grown at a 
higher rate than the richest regions, although the rate of convergence has been found to 
be very low. Moreover, the author argues that disparities are not that high among 
Portuguese regions. The author also points to a deceleration of convergence in the 
1990s and even divergence from 1995 onwards. Norte and Centro are the regions that 
suffered the most with the last business cycle. 
 
GDP per capita, employment rate and GVA per worker
5
 
Figure III.1 illustrate the evolution of GDP per capita in the Portuguese NUTS II 
regions, as indices relative to Portugal (set at 100). It shows that, between 1980 and 
1993, almost all the regions have worsened their GDP per capita levels with reference to 
the national average. The ranking of the regions has suffered some changes: regions at 
the middle of the distribution have remained in their positions, but there have been some 
changes at the bottom and at the top positions. A particular case is Centro, the richest 
region in 1980, with GDP per capita two times higher than the national average. After 
                                                 
5 Figures on regional output are being subject to successive revisions and data are not necessarily 
consistent across tables. For this reason, we try to identify in each table the specific database being used. 
In the latest DGRegio database, data from GDP and GVA appear to reveal some inconsistencies, 
especially to Centro in the period 1980-1990. 
  {PAGE  }1993, it suffered a large decrease and by 2001 it was 30 per cent below Portuguese 
average. The region Lisboa e Vale do Tejo outstanding all the other regions by very 
large margins and had an evolution contrary to the Centro decrease. On the other hand 
witnessed an improvement in relative standing: it starts at the bottom of the ranking and 
in 2001, it occupies the second place with Madeira. 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo was the richest region at the end of the sample, Norte was among 
the top three at all times and Alentejo was consistently one of the poorest region.     
Table III.1 presents average annual growth rates of regional GDP per capita. The 
average growth rate for Portugal varied considerable from one period to the next. The 
period 1981-1986 was the period of fast growth, with an improvement in GDP per 
capita of fourteen per cent per year. The grow rate in the others sub periods was slow 
for more than a decade and it reaches less than 3 per cent a year. 
The average growth rate of Portuguese GDP per capita is not equally distributed among 
regions. The region that grew faster in all periods was Algarve. Açores and Madeira had 
below average growth rate in almost all periods. The rich regions had irregular 
behaviour, with high growth in some periods and low in others, compared to Portuguese 
average: Norte and Centro were the only regions that had negative average annual 
growth rate (between 1992 and 1998) and none of the rich regions had an average 
growth rate above Portuguese average in all periods. These patterns are consistent with 
a narrowing of the differences among the regions over time in GDP per capita.  
While in 1980 Centro had a GDP per capita ten times higher than Alentejo, by 2001 the 
wealthier region, Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, was a bit less than twice as rich as Açores.        
Differences in the employment rate
6 also play a role in explaining regional asymmetries, 
and there has also been some convergence in this regard.  The Portuguese evolution of 
employment parallels the evolution of GDP for the most part but neither for all regions 
nor all periods. The period of 1980-1986, a period of high growth of GDP per capita, 
exhibited negative employment rate growth in the country (see table III.2).  
The employment losses and gains were unevenly distributed among regions. There have 
been clear gains in laggard regions and losses in more central areas (e.g. Porto, in the 
Norte, and Lisboa). Until 1995, Centro and Alentejo took first places in the ranking. 
                                                 
6 Employment Rate = Employment/working age population.  
  {PAGE  }Since 1995, Lisboa e Vale do Tejo was the region with higher values for employment 
rate. This evolution, in particular, reflects the process of restructuring and development 
of an urban-metropolitan profile reflected in the development of the service sector and 
of New Technology-Based Industries. This concentration had impact on regional 
evolution of employment rate, consequently the richer regions had higher levels of 
employment. 
In general, regions that experienced slow growth in GDP tended to have low or negative 
employment growth rates, but the opposite is not always true. For example, Algarve 
tended to do relatively well in terms of employment growth in expansionary periods and 
poorly in recessionary periods.  
Traditionally, most of Portugal’s economic activities were concentrated in the Norte and 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo and its surrounding area. The regional concentration of economic 
activity has continued over the 1990s and even slightly increased, especially in favour 
of Lisboa area.   
Productivity availed trough GVA per worker is another indicator that can be used to 
measure economic performance and, consequently, to conclude about regional 
disparities. Breaking down differences in per capita GDP among Portuguese regions in 
different components, Ramos and Rodrigues (2001) conclude that regional disparities 
(in NUTS II and NUTS III) are only partially accounted for by differences in production 
efficiency. Probably this indicator (figure III.2) is the one that allow better to conclude 
about convergence in Portuguese regions: all regions converge to national average. 
Table III.3 presents GVA per worker in 1980, 1986, 1992, 1999 and 2001 and the 
growth average rate between these years. In 1980 there was huge differences between 
the region with higher productivity (Centro - with 9,81 thousands euros per worker) and 
Alentejo, with 1,18. In 2001, this difference was reduced: Lisboa e Vale do Tejo had 
only more 40 per cent than Açores. 
Almost all regions began, in 1980, with productivity above Portuguese average, with 
exception of the south regions: Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, Alentejo e Algarve. All of them 
(except Lisboa e Vale do Tejo) decreased along the 21- years period in study. As we 
already mentioned in GDP per capita, Centro had a very strange evolution: this region 
started to be the region with higher GVA per worker and in the end of the period it 
occupies the last ranking places, with Alentejo and Açores. 
  {PAGE  }As we can see, the regions with higher growth of productivity were Algarve and 
Alentejo, the ones that had the lowest levels of GVA per capita. This could mean, per 
si, convergence, however, the growth was also higher in Lisboa e Vale do Tejo. This 
region was the one that had the higher growth in all period we study. Supporting our 
conclusion we can refer Amorim et al (2004) where we can read that Alentejo suffers 
from a low productivity level and Algarve exhibited quite favourable dynamic in terms 
of productivity changes. 
 
 
IV. Analysis of the Effect of Regional Transfers on Regional Economic 
Performance 
 
To assess the impact of the transfers to municipalities on regional development, we 
compare the economic performance of two groups of regions between 1980 and 2001. 
Following Garcia - Milá et al (1996), we consider that one group consists of regions that 
are consistently above average on various economic indicators and below average in 
terms of transfers receipt from the Central Government. This group is called “non-
receivers group”, and it consists of Norte and Lisboa e vale do Tejo. The other group 
consists of regions that are consistently below average on most of the economic 
indicators and above average in terms of transfers receipt and is called “receivers 
group”. In this group we classified Alentejo, Algarve e Açores (see classification in 
figure IV.1).  
We are concerned in assessing whether the Central Government transfers’ policy has 
impact in aggregate measures of economic activity. We examine three different 
measures of economic well being or economic activity: i) Regional GDP per capita; ii) 
Employment rate; iii) Regional GVA per worker. Each variable was taken as 
independent variable in a regression with annual observations by region estimated using 
OLS.  
This approach says very little about whether the transfers have caused changes in the 
economic performance of the regions.  
  {PAGE  }The results in table IV.1 (rows 1) indicate that transfers to municipalities of the period 
appears to be associated with improvements in regional GDP per capita, except for 
Centro
7.  
In the results displayed in table IV.2 we find no evidence that the transfers policy is 
associated with improvements in employment rate for any region. The variable transfers 
per capita is no statistically significant for any region. 
Table IV.3 presents results for the GVA per worker. In all regions central transfers per 
capita seems to explain regional productivity expansion, with exception of Centro. In all 
regional estimations, transfers per capita are statistically significant at 1 per cent of 
probability. For Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, Alentejo and Algarve more than eighty per cent 
of the variation of GVA per capita is explained by transfers per capita (we can see by 
the value of R
2). Once more we must point out the case of Centro that had an unusual 
evolution in GVA between 1980 and 1993. This decrease could not be explained by the 
evolution of transfers and it has to do more with statistical adjustment in EUROSTAT 
calculations or in accounting rules. 
One difficulty we encounter in trying to uncover an effect of the transfers on the 
economies of the poor regions is that, with the limited data available, it is difficult to 
unravel the effect of being a receiver region with the effect of being a poor region. In an 
effort to control for the effect of being receiver, we re-estimated the equations including 
a lagged value of the dependent variable. The inclusion of this variable improved the 
estimation for Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, Alentejo e Algarve, in what concerns to GDP per 
capita and GVA per worker. In this three regions, considered in 1980 as below 
Portuguese average, it seems that transfers per capita (lagged) had impact in economic 
performance. 
In what concerns to employment rate it still seems that there’s no relation between 
central transfers and this measure of economic activity. This conclusion has been 
anticipated in the section III when we evaluate the performance and assessed that the 
most part of the regions had an unusual evolution.   
A main difficulty we face is that the period we examine was a period of massive 
changes in the economy, policy and politics of Portugal and its regions. It would be 
exceedingly difficult if not impossible to attempt to model all of the relevant processes 
                                                 
7 This result is related with the inconsistency of data already mentioned in section III.  
  {PAGE  }and causes of regional economic growth. What our approach offers is a simple 






In Portugal, the transfers from the Central Government to the regional entities endowed 
them with the indispensable minimum financial capacity for their functioning. This is 
their first evident intending. Cohesion policy should foster convergence between the 
regions. The data allows concluding that a necessary condition for its effectiveness is 
satisfied: it redistributes funds from rich to poor regions through a sharing revenue 
system. Even though the cohesion objectives have constitutional commitment, it is not 
effectively observed. Although poor regions receive relatively much support, rich 
regions still receive some. This seems to mitigate the impact because every region 
received funds. 
This paper has analysed the relationship between Central Government transfers and 
some measures of economic performance (GDP per capita, employment rate and GVA 
per worker) in the seven Portuguese regions. The main purpose of the paper is to 
evaluate if the system of public transfers has affected the intra-regional Portuguese 
convergence.  
The results from estimation with all the measures does not allow to conclude, with 
confidence, that transfers to municipalities has impact in regional economic 
performance. This outcome could be justified by the available data or by the choice of 
the period we made. The period 1980-1990 was a period of massive changes in the 
economy, policy and politics of Portugal and its regions and these facts were not taken 
in account in ours estimations. We need further research to justify this conclusion. 
The recent changes in the legislation suggest that in the future the Central Government 
transfers will effectively reduce regional imbalances. Nevertheless, the scope for 
increasing governmental funding is very limited indeed, highlighting quality of the local 
expenditures and the efficiency of the location criteria for distribution of funds among 
municipalities. 
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Number of inhabitants 35% 45% 45% 40%
5 35%
5 50%
Municipalities area 15% 10% 10% 15% 30% 25%
Number of Parish 15% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Equal distribution by the minicipalities 5% 10% 15% 15% 25%
Population with less than 15 years old 5% 5%
Compensation fiscal index 5% _
6
Socio-economic development index 35% 20% 5% _
6
Personal income tax 10%
Acessibilities 5%
Municipal road network 10% 10%
Direct taxes per capita 15% 10%
Number of houses 5%





Sources: Local Finance Law and further revisions. 
Notes 
1 FEF - Financial Balance Fund; 
2 FGM - Municipalities' General Fund; 
3 FCM - Municipal Cohesion Fund; 
4 FFF - Parish 
Financing Fund; 
5 Total population plus daily average of night's lodging in camping and hotels; 
6 Each year the weight of this 





Table II.2 - Transfers as percentage of GDP 
 
1980 1986 1992 1999 2001 1980-1986 1987-1991 1992-1998 1999-2001
0,82 0,94 0,99 1,67 2,26 2,55 1,60 7,76 8,50
0,73 0,78 1,25 2,00 2,52 1,48 2,67 11,73 8,36
0,47 0,55 1,37 2,92 3,76 3,32 9,35 20,07 8,82
1,23 1,40 0,96 0,88 1,08 2,63 -9,67 -1,35 7,11
5,92 6,64 4,55 5,06 6,84 2,37 -10,36 0,06 13,17
4,11 5,32 2,84 2,29 2,76 4,84 -14,93 -2,61 5,61
1,07 1,27 2,69 3,69 5,16 3,13 8,25 11,54 9,88
0,55 0,69 1,36 1,77 2,72 3,94 7,47 10,94 11,07
-0,703 -0,689 -0,835 -0,772 -0,771
0,041 0,044 0,017 0,015 0,016












Growth average rate (%)
 
Sources: EUROSTAT, June 2003; Orçamentos de Estado, DGO-MF 
Notes: 
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Table II.3 - Transfers per capita 
 
1980 1986 1992 1999 2001 1980-1986 1987-1991 1992-1998 1999-2001
15,21 38,34 90,14 147,25 196,11 16,73 15,80 7,96 13,60
13,63 34,83 82,78 137,23 184,09 16,96 15,77 8,48 13,67
19,05 48,96 113,71 187,84 252,10 17,16 15,25 8,44 13,59
11,86 28,33 63,71 98,36 125,50 15,70 15,60 6,60 11,76
29,04 74,35 184,58 321,44 449,63 17,14 16,36 8,99 16,67
19,59 62,56 125,50 177,04 224,14 21,56 13,57 4,68 12,02
19,56 44,35 136,85 227,97 320,46 14,81 21,91 8,42 16,04
11,38 27,89 88,32 157,76 219,32 16,30 22,31 9,43 16,23
-0,242 -0,300 -0,653 -0,692 -0,709
0,005 0,006 0,007 0,008 0,008
0,045 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 Chi-square (%)
Variation coefficient










Growth average rate (%)
 
Sources: EUROSTAT, June 2003; Orçamentos de Estado, DGO-MF 
Notes: 




Table III.1 - GDP per capita 
 
1980 1986 1992 1999 2001 1981-1986 1987-1991 1992-1998 1999-2001
1,84 4,08 6,65 8,28 8,63 14,42 10,46 2,65 2,61
1,87 4,44 6,61 6,86 7,32 15,83 9,20 -0,41 3,41
4,09 8,84 8,30 6,44 6,71 13,98 1,66 -5,57 2,73
0,96 2,02 6,62 11,22 11,58 13,36 24,22 9,13 2,16
0,49 1,12 4,06 6,35 6,58 15,04 26,49 8,43 1,65
0,48 1,18 4,42 7,73 8,11 16,54 27,06 9,82 3,17
1,83 3,49 5,08 6,18 6,21 11,70 8,50 1,55 2,43
2,06 4,07 6,30 8,24 8,07 12,31 9,59 3,08 0,96










Source: EUROSTAT, June 2003 
Note: Values in thousand euros 
 
 
Table III.2 - Employment rate 
 
1980 1986 1992 1999 2001 1981-1986 1987-1991 1992-1998 1999-2001
0,64 0,57 0,69 0,70 0,72 -1,84 4,35 -0,22 1,38
0,63 0,58 0,66 0,68 0,70 -1,34 3,63 -0,24 1,20
0,69 0,60 0,72 0,69 0,71 -2,24 4,99 -1,34 1,90
0,62 0,58 0,71 0,74 0,76 -1,07 4,47 0,40 1,36
0,73 0,50 0,60 0,62 0,66 -5,73 4,49 -0,09 2,56
0,65 0,46 0,78 0,70 0,69 -5,12 12,87 -1,64 -0,36
0,65 0,56 0,59 0,61 0,62 -2,22 1,53 -0,79 2,57
0,64 0,55 0,63 0,67 0,68 -2,38 1,75 1,58 0,21










Source: EUROSTAT, June 2003 
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Table III.3 - GVA per worker 
 
1980 1986 1992 1999 2001 1981-1986 1987-1991 1992-1998 1999-2001
4,53 10,99 14,46 17,48 17,81 16,31 5,68 2,69 1,34
4,62 11,63 14,74 14,66 15,25 17,06 5,23 -0,52 2,32
9,81 23,98 17,83 14,19 14,36 16,49 -3,10 -4,56 0,83
2,37 5,21 13,59 22,04 22,28 14,46 18,86 8,75 1,01
1,18 3,82 10,70 16,10 15,93 22,63 19,74 8,65 -0,56
1,19 3,94 8,73 16,57 17,74 23,02 15,38 11,57 3,43
4,92 10,71 13,82 15,60 15,22 14,20 5,53 1,55 -0,53
5,26 12,09 15,44 18,32 17,74 15,25 6,42 1,03 0,54
Centro
Lisboa e V.do Tejo
Alentejo






Source: EUROSTAT, June 2003 









Constant TF TFt-1 R
2
3153,34 29,34
 [0.00]*  [0.00]*
3387,19 42,42 -16,88
 [0.00]*  [0,424] [0,772]
7421,65 -1,94
 [0.00]*   [0,765] 
7840,58 64,65 77,25
 [0.00]*   [0,347]   [0,31] 
-470,87 115,2








 [0,009]*   [0.00]* 
-739,67 -13,04 63,83
 [0,01]*   [0,469]   [0,003]* 
2617,02 14,54
 [0.00]*   [0.00]* 
2816,9 13,32 -0,6
 [0.00]*   [0,417]   [0,976] 
3104 30,26
 [0.00]*   [0.00]* 
3280,8 15,35 15,42









































Table IV.2 - Employment rate 
 
Constant TF TFt-1 R
2
0.6 0,00
 [0.00]*   [0.00]* 
0,59 0,002 -0,001
 [0.00]*  [0,233] [0,0425]*
0,64 0,0029
 [0.00]*   [0,044]* 
0,63 0,0024 -0,0023
 [0.00]*   [0,110]***   [0,163] 
0,57 0,002
 [0.00]*   [0.00]* 
0,56 0,003 -0,0014
 [0.00]*  [0,23] [0,598]
0,596 0,00
 [0.00]*   [0,768] 
0,579 0,0011 -0,0012
 [0.00]*  [0,331] [0,374]
0,571 0,0007
 [0.00]*   [0,033]* 
0,555 0,0022 -0,0015
 [0.00]*   [0,457]   [0,632] 
0,6 -0,00004
 [0.00]*   [0,525] 
0,5944 0,0008 -0,0009
 [0.00]*   [0,209]   [0,2] 
0,58 0,00045
 [0.00]*   [0.001]* 
0,574 -0,0004 0,001
 [0.00]*   [0,742]   [0,458] 
Norte


































Table IV.3 - Gross Value Added per worker 
 
Constant TF TFt-1 R
2
8,564 0,052
 [0.00]*   [0.00]* 
9,24 0,027 0,0203
 [0.00]*  [0,839] [0,891]
19,1 -0,0187
 [0.00]*   [0,289] 
20,3 0,085 -0,124
 [0.00]*   [0,648]   [0,547] 
0,436 0,217








 [0,132]   [0.00]* 
-0,669 -0,057 0,1641
 [0,228]   [0,141]   [0,001]* 
8,177 0,0325
 [0.00]*   [0.00]* 
8,68 0,019 0,013
 [0.00]*   [0,742]   [0,844] 
9,387 0,0554
 [0.00]*   [0.00]* 
9,974 0,0492 0,00198
 [0.00]*   [0,659]   [0,987] 
0,1374
Norte




















Notes: t-statistic (in brackets) significant at *1%, **5% and ***10%; TF means Total Funds 
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1980 1983 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Transfers to municipalities Other receipts
 
Sources: Local finance law; Orçamentos de Estado, DGO-MF  
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Public transfers per capita to municipalities GDP per capita
 
 
Sources: EUROSTAT, June 2003; Orçamentos de Estado, DGO-MF 
Notes: In 2001 public transfers per capita include Municipal Cohesion Fund, Municipalities' General Fund, Parish Financing Fund 
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Source: EUROSTAT, June 2003 









































































































Source: EUROSTAT, June 2003 
Note: Portugal  = 100 
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